Toward a Design Orientation

Nine months ago I wrote about Design Orientation as an alternative to Finance Orientation — the model which has governed business thinking for the past 50+ years.

Today, I read an amazing article in the Financial Times by John Kay, a member of the advisory board of the Institute for New Economic Thinking and simply had to share it because it represents the first truly honest step in coming to terms with the failed economic thinking, theories and policies that have driven the world to the edge of utter financial and socioeconomic collapse. I am happy to quote the article below and also link to the author’s original source page:

The macroeconomics taught in advanced economics today is largely based on analysis labelled dynamic stochastic general equilibrium. The unappealing title gives the game away: the theorists are mostly talking to themselves. Their theories proved virtually useless in anticipating the crisis, analysing its development and recommending measures to deal with it.

A remarkably distinguished group of economists gathered last weekend for the inaugural conference of the Institute for New Economic Thinking, an initiative of George Soros. They were soul searching over the failures of economics in the recent crisis. Such failures are most evident in two areas: the inadequacies of the efficient market hypothesis, the bedrock of modern financial economics, and the irrelevance of recent macroeconomic theory.

The central idea of the efficient market hypothesis is that prices represent the best estimate of the underlying value of assets. This thesis has recently taken a battering. The boom and bust in the money markets was precipitated by a US housing bubble. That bubble followed the New Economy fiasco and was preceded by the near-failure of Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund designed to showcase sophisticated financial economics.

The macroeconomics taught in advanced economics today is largely based on analysis labelled dynamic stochastic general equilibrium. The unappealing title gives the game away: the theorists are mostly talking to themselves. Their theories proved virtually useless in anticipating the crisis, analysing its development and recommending measures to deal with it.

Recent economic policy debates have not only largely ignored DSGE, but have also been remarkably similar to the economic policy debates of the 1930s, although they have been resolved differently. The economists quoted most often are John Maynard Keynes and Hyman Minsky, both of whom are dead.

Both the efficient market hypothesis and DSGE are associated with the idea of rational expectations – which might be described as the idea that households and companies make economic decisions as if they had available to them all the information about the world that might be available. If you wonder why such an implausible notion has won wide acceptance, part of the explanation lies in its conservative implications. Under rational expectations, not only do firms and households know already as much as policymakers, but they also anticipate what the government itself will do, so the best thing government can do is to remain predictable. Most economic policy is futile.

So is most interference in free markets. There is no room for the notion that people bought subprime mortgages or securitised products based on them because they knew less than the people who sold them. When the men and women of Goldman Sachs perform “God’s work”, the profits they make come not from information advantages, but from the value of their services. The economic role of government is to keep markets working.

These theories have appeal beyond the ranks of the rich and conservative for a deeper reason. If there were a simple, single, universal theory of economic behaviour, then the suite of arguments comprising rational expectations, efficient markets and DSEG would be that theory. Any other way of describing the world would have to recognise that what people do depends on their fallible beliefs and perceptions, would have to acknowledge uncertainty, and would accommodate the dependence of actions on changing social and cultural norms. Models could not then be universal: they would have to be specific to contexts.

The standard approach has the appearance of science in its ability to generate clear predictions from a small number of axioms. But only the appearance, since these predictions are mostly false. The environment actually faced by investors and economic policymakers is one in which actions do depend on beliefs and perceptions, must deal with uncertainty and are the product of a social context. There is no universal economic theory, and new economic thinking must necessarily be eclectic. That insight is Keynes’s greatest legacy.

Life Inc: The Movie
A nine-minute history of corporatism.

Douglas Rushkoff’s book, LIFE, Inc. and this associated video clip are right up my alley.

I love the comfort dollars example in this video (around 6 minutes 50 seconds in). Restauranteur offers $120 comfort dollars (to be spent at his establishment) for every $100 his customers invest (20% return on investment for the customer [this concept of return on investment for the customer is key]).

This is an excellent example of Design Orientation.

@GrahamHill said, “The death of shareholder value is greatly exagerrated -  http://tinyurl.com/lt2tma - balancing EVA, PVA and CVA is hard,” in response to my post entitled, Design Thinking is Dead. Long Live Design Orientation.
I would have responded on Twitter but since it would take slightly more than 140 characters, I would have to say thank you for the PDF. I’ve taken the time to read through it and would have to say that in defense of shareholder value would certainly raise a (big) problem of definition indeed.

Welch, Martin and others imply that the theory is about maximizing the stock price. Companies that manage for shareholder value, the thinking goes, do whatever it takes to engineer a lofty market price, including delivering the highest possible earnings per share. That is a profound misunderstanding of what creating shareholder value is about.
Managers create shareholder value when they invest to maximize the present value of long-term free cash flows. Investments include capital spending, research and development, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and share repurchases. These investments also include managing human capital, the task of putting the right people in the right jobs.

I would have to disagree with the author of the PDF’s lofty, idealized definition and agree with those who’ve served in the trenches of the fortune 500, pressured to deliver short-term earnings per share at any cost. The books and theories may claim one thing, but behavior illustrates something completely different.
Another issue worth bringing up here is the difference between shareholders and stakeholders. While shareholders gain or lose directly as a result of the actions of firms, stakeholders gain or lose indirectly, yet are also affected by the behavior of firms without any input as to the firm’s behavior.
While all shareholders are stakeholders, not all stakeholders are shareholders. For example, when GM goes bust, its customers (stakeholders) are affected — whether or not they own stock in the company.
The fact that shareholder value maximization does not take stakeholders into account makes finance orientation toward shareholder value maximization an inherently flawed and short-term oriented approach, which renders it unsustainable — morally and literally bankrupt.

@GrahamHill said, “The death of shareholder value is greatly exagerrated - http://tinyurl.com/lt2tma - balancing EVA, PVA and CVA is hard,” in response to my post entitled, Design Thinking is Dead. Long Live Design Orientation.

I would have responded on Twitter but since it would take slightly more than 140 characters, I would have to say thank you for the PDF. I’ve taken the time to read through it and would have to say that in defense of shareholder value would certainly raise a (big) problem of definition indeed.

Welch, Martin and others imply that the theory is about maximizing the stock price. Companies that manage for shareholder value, the thinking goes, do whatever it takes to engineer a lofty market price, including delivering the highest possible earnings per share. That is a profound misunderstanding of what creating shareholder value is about.

Managers create shareholder value when they invest to maximize the present value of long-term free cash flows. Investments include capital spending, research and development, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and share repurchases. These investments also include managing human capital, the task of putting the right people in the right jobs.

I would have to disagree with the author of the PDF’s lofty, idealized definition and agree with those who’ve served in the trenches of the fortune 500, pressured to deliver short-term earnings per share at any cost. The books and theories may claim one thing, but behavior illustrates something completely different.

Another issue worth bringing up here is the difference between shareholders and stakeholders. While shareholders gain or lose directly as a result of the actions of firms, stakeholders gain or lose indirectly, yet are also affected by the behavior of firms without any input as to the firm’s behavior.

While all shareholders are stakeholders, not all stakeholders are shareholders. For example, when GM goes bust, its customers (stakeholders) are affected — whether or not they own stock in the company.

The fact that shareholder value maximization does not take stakeholders into account makes finance orientation toward shareholder value maximization an inherently flawed and short-term oriented approach, which renders it unsustainable — morally and literally bankrupt.